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Introduction 
Even though April Fool’s day is an inauspicious day for a wedding, you still 
would not expect the marriage to end with the bride suing the Cuban gov-
ernment for non-consensual sex. Yet that was the conclusion of Ana Mar-
garita Martinez’s marriage to Juan Pablo Roque, after he left their Florida 
residence, never to return (Bragg 1999). The mystery of his disappearance 
was resolved a few days later when he appeared on television broadcast 
from Havana, unveiling himself as an undercover spy sent to infiltrate the 
dissident community in the United States. This was surprising, and unwel-
come, news to Martinez, who thought she had married a fellow dissident. 
Consequently, she filed a lawsuit about the deception against his employer. 
Since Cuba was not accustomed to defending itself in Florida’s courts, it 
did not contest the suit, and Martinez was awarded millions of dollars in 
damages. Part of her case was based on her claim that the fraud meant that 
she did not give valid consent to sex with Roque. As her lawyer put it, ''She 
would not have given her consent, had she known.” 
 Martinez’s case is controversial—is sex non-consensual when it re-
sults from someone disguising their career, allegiances and motives? This 
question is diﬃcult and weighty: typically, it is appropriate to censure non-
consensual sex heavily in law. Consequently, sexual consent has been a fo-
cus of research into the relationship between deception and consent, and 
this chapter will reflect this emphasis. But the issue also arises for other 
types of consent. If someone impersonates a police oﬃcer, then she lacks 
valid consent to entering someone’s home. If someone misrepresents the 
risks of a clinical study, then she lacks her research subjects’ valid consent. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, let us define non-consensual be-
havior as behavior for which the agent needs, but lacks, the other person’s 
valid consent. Then we can ask two key questions. First, when does decep-
tion lead to non-consensual behavior? Second, why does it do so? These 
questions are orthogonal to other moral evaluations of deception. Perhaps, 
deception is pro tanto morally wrong, because it involves treating people as 
“mere means” (O’Neill 1985), and undermines valuable communication 
(Shiﬀrin 2014). Or perhaps deception can be benign or even salutary, pro-
tecting our privacy (Nagel 2006), smoothing social interactions (Calhoun 
2000), or allowing mystery to build attraction (Buss 2005). These moral 
evaluations are separate from the relation between deception and consent. 
Deception that is morally objectionable in itself might not lead to non-con-
sensual behavior, and vice versa. 
 This chapter focuses on “permissive consent” (see this Handbook’s 
Chapters, THE SCOPE OF CONSENT and THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF CONSENT). 
Permissive consent waives a right against an interaction, releasing some-
one from her duty not to engage in it. So wherever rights protect realms of 
our lives, permissive consent allows us to share these realms. In addition 
to permissive consent, the English word “consent” can refer to agreements 
that create obligations, such as promises. Deception can also be a problem 
for these agreements, but while this topic is important, it will be passed 
over here. 
 For our purposes, let us define deception as intentionally causing 
someone to form a false belief. This definition includes paradigmatic lies 
— understood as deliberate assertions of falsehoods — as well as mislead-
ing statements and omissions. It excludes omissions that merely allow pre-
existing false beliefs to persist. It also excludes concealment that does not 
create false beliefs. Currently, I am concealing from you my address, with-
out deceiving you. 
 This chapter will discuss accounts of how and why deception leads 
to non-consensual behavior, introducing a distinction between “duty-first” 
and “awareness-first” approaches. Duty-first approaches begin by specify-
ing key duties not to deceive a consent-giver. These approaches then hold 
that the consent-receiver lacks the consent-giver’s valid consent because 
she has not carried out these duties. By contrast, awareness-first ap-
proaches start with an account of key features of an interaction of which a 
validly consenting person must be aware. If they like, an awareness-first 
theorist can then appeal to this awareness to derive duties not to deceive. 
To be clear from the start, these approaches need not be exclusive, since it 
may be that there is more than one way that deception can lead to non-
consensual behavior. Moreover, there is little reason to think they are 
jointly exhaustive, as it is plausible to think that there are other theoretical 
options waiting to be explored.  Still, it is hopefully a helpful distinction i
for orientating us with the topic of deception and consent. 
Duty-first approaches 
A duty-first approach begins with the thought that valid consent requires 
certain background conditions to be in place. For example, we might think 
of giving consent as a form of transaction. To ensure this is a “fair transac-
tion,” the consent-receiver may need to discharge key duties towards the 
consent-giver (Miller & Wertheimer 2009). These duties would plausibly 
include duties not to coerce the consent-giver, as well as duties to disclose 
information and to avoid certain types of deception. A duty-first approach 
then appeals to these duties in order to develop an account of when the 
deceiver lacks the consent-giver’s valid consent to an action: when the de-
ceiver fails to discharge one of these duties, the victim does not validly 
consent to the action. 
 This order of explanation seems to fit many people’s intuitions 
about when a deceiver lacks valid consent since it places importance on the 
aetiology of false beliefs relevant to decisions to consent (Beyleveld & 
Brownsmith 2007: 147). If false beliefs are not caused by the consent-re-
ceiver, then the context need not be unfair. But if these beliefs result from 
the consent-receiver not fulfilling her duties, then the consent-receiver 
could lack valid consent. Placing importance on the aetiology of false be-
liefs is the main advantage of a duty-first approach. Its main disadvantage 
is that it owes us an account of the boundary between key duties not to 
deceive (which must be discharged for valid consent to the encounter in 
question) from minor duties not to deceive (which need not be discharged 
for valid consent to that encounter). 
 Determining these key duties is a complex task. The duties plaus-
ibly vary with diﬀerent types of consent. For property consent, some de-
ception seems fair game. For example, in commercial exchanges, both 
parties may disguise their interests and resources, in the course of arriving 
at a valid agreement. For example, Smith might play down her interest in 
leasing Jones's car, while Jones might mislead Smith about the lowest price 
that she would accept. Moreover, people are allowed some “puﬀery” when 
presenting the value of their property (Shiﬀrin 2014). This is not to say 
that anything goes in property exchanges. Vendors and lessors may not 
deceive consumers about critical features of their products. Indeed, this 
would frequently be fraud. Similarly, a consumer may not pay with coun-
terfeit money. It is hard to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable decep-
tion in property exchanges, and there may be several ways of doing so. 
Here we encounter broader philosophical questions concerning the role for 
conventions in the ethics of property. Plausibly, the answers to these ques-
tions will determine much about our key duties not to deceive with respect 
to property consent. 
 What about consent to therapeutic medical treatment or partici-
pation in research? Here legal and institutional norms bear on how decep-
tion relates to consent. Professionals are obligated by institutional codes, 
and legally obligated by the laws of their jurisdiction. Assuming these 
codes and laws are adequately just, they bear on moral obligations. These 
codes do not just cover deception, but also duties of disclosure. These du-
ties are linked. If a physician must disclose a risk factor, then she is re-
quired not to deceive the patient about the risk factor, and not to conceal 
the risk factor from the patient. Since duties of disclosure generate both 
duties not to deceive and not to conceal, we should take disclosure as fun-
damental here. Consequently, we should start theorizing how deception 
relates to consent to research and therapy by thinking of duties of disclo-
sure. (Manson & O’Neill 2003; see also the chapters in this handbook on 
INFORMED CONSENT; CONSENT AND MEDICAL TREATMENT; and CONSENT IN 
CLINICAL RESEARCH.) 
 For sexual consent, the issue is complicated by the fact that decep-
tion features widely in people’s sexual lives (Buss 2005). The relevant 
philosophical debate has been framed by a distinction in Anglo-American 
law between “fraud in the factum” and “fraud in the inducement.” (Fein-
berg 1986, following Perkins 1957: 856; Westen 2004). Fraud in the factum 
misrepresents the nature of the sexual encounter itself. The law typically 
conceives of this narrowly, including impersonation or disguising a sexual 
encounter as a medical procedure (Falk 1998). This deception would typic-
ally lead to legally non-consensual sex. All other deception is considered 
fraud in the inducement. A paradigm would be deception about one’s ro-
mantic intentions. The thought is that if someone engages in a sexual en-
counter because her partner pretends to be interested in a long-term rela-
tionship, then she is not misled about the sexual encounter itself and so 
still validly consents to the sexual encounter. The phrase “fraud in the in-
ducement” may suggest it covers only fraud about people’s incentives. But 
for the factum / inducement distinction to be exhaustive, the inducement 
category must also cover deception about any “peripheral” feature of the 
interaction that is not fraud about one of the “core” features that consti-
tutes fraud in the factum. 
 The factum / inducement distinction has received much criticism 
(Wertheimer 2003; Manson ms). For a start, it is hard to oﬀer a principled 
basis for distinguishing facts that concern the sexual encounter and facts 
that do not, without this distinction yielding an over-inclusive conception 
of fraud in the factum. What should we “pack into” the description of the 
sexual act itself (Feinberg 1986; McGregor 2005)? Should the act be de-
scribed as sex with a married man? If so, then a man pretending to be 
single would be committing deception about the sexual act itself. In addi-
tion, it appears ad hoc to apply the factum / inducement distinction to sexu-
al consent, given a similar distinction would bear no weight in other do-
mains (Schulhofer 1998; Rubenfeld 2013). For example, if one person 
fraudulently oﬀers inducements for engaging in a property exchange, then 
this fraud will typically leave the exchange legally void. These criticisms 
would target the factum / inducement distinction both as a principle for 
rape law, and as the basis for moral principles. 
 If we reject the factum / inducement distinction, what can we put in 
its place to distinguish e.g. key duties not to impersonate people (which 
must be fulfilled for valid consent to the encounter in question) from 
minor duties not to lie about one’s income (which need not)?  
 One option appeals to people’s expectations about the likelihood of 
diﬀerent harms. Perhaps, an impersonator lacks their victim’s valid con-
sent because impersonation is so unexpected. Meanwhile, people lie so 
often about their income that detecting such a lie would not lead to a deep 
sense of harm. This option could yield either normative principles for 
framing the criminal law (McGregor 2005: 181-189), or moral principles. 
Indeed, it seems independently plausible to emphasize expectations if we 
think that morally valid consent consists in communication. What a 
speech-act communicates depends on conversational participants’ shared 
assumptions (Stalnaker 2014). These assumptions will typically depend on 
the social and legal context. 
 Another option distinguishes types of information about which 
someone is required or permitted to share with sexual partners. For exam-
ple, someone might be required to disclose STIs, but not whether they 
were a victim of a sex crime. In addition, it could be that we are required 
to disclose some information on request, but we need not provide of our 
own accord. This gives us an account of our duties of disclosure. We could 
use this account to say that a deceiver lacks their victim’s valid consent to 
sex if and only if the deception involves failing to discharge a duty of dis-
closure (Lazenby & Gabriel forthcoming). Thus, we would derive norms 
governing deception from norms of disclosure, in the way that we do for 
medical and research consent. 
 A more radical option holds that we have duties not to deceive oth-
ers about any feature that is materially relevant to their decisions to con-
sent (Dougherty 2013).  We might worry that alternative views implicitly ii
rely on a notion of sex that is moralized insofar as certain features of a 
sexual encounter are deemed more objectively important than other fea-
tures, independently of what the participants consider important 
(Dougherty 2013). Moreover, we may think that a “fair transaction” ac-
count suggests a radical position on deception and consent (Miller & Wer-
theimer 2009). Deception that is materially relevant to someone’s de-
“merely as a means” (O’Neill 1985; Pallikkathayil 2010). Consequently, 
material deception would typically bring about an unfair context for con-
sent. This option is radical because it implies that deception about one’s 
income will lead to non-consensual sex when income is material to 
someone's decision to consent to sex. Consequently, we would need to 
either revise down our estimate of the moral and legal importance of con-
sent (Rubenfeld 2013), or revise up our estimate of how morally wrong 
deceiving someone into sex is (Dougherty 2013) and how stringently the 
law should penalize it (Larson 1993; Herring 2005). 
  
Awareness-first approaches 
Awareness-first approaches start with an account of the awareness that 
someone must have of an interaction, in order to validly consent to it. If 
they like, these approaches can then use this account to derive our duties 
of disclosure and our duties not to deceive.  
 Consequently, a principal benefit of an awareness-first approach is 
potentially that it provides us with a framework to determine the nature of 
these duties. To complete this task, we would need to consider other inter-
ests, such as consent-receivers’ interests in privacy or in avoiding various 
costs of disclosure. But once we have factored in these interests, we have 
an underlying rationale for the existence and shape of these duties: these 
duties’ goal is to provide consent-givers with the awareness necessary for 
valid consent. 
 The principal cost to an awareness-first approach is that it does not 
place any intrinsic importance on the aetiology of false beliefs or ignorance 
when determining whether these lead to non-consensual behavior. If a 
consent-giver’s false belief by itself is enough for an absence of valid con-
sent, then it would not matter, with respect to the validity of the consent, 
whether this false belief has arisen by an innocent mistake, by non-disclo-
sure or by deception. This will strike many as counterintuitive. An aware-
ness-first theorist could sweeten this pill by allowing that other moral 
phenomena are sensitive to this aetiology. For example, the consent-re-
ceiver’s blameworthiness for non-consensual behavior could depend on 
whether she knew of the false belief, and in turn this knowledge may de-
pend on the belief ’s aetiology. Similarly, this knowledge may influence 
how morally problematic the interaction is in other respects; for example, 
the knowledge may influence the extent to which someone is being ma-
nipulated, and manipulation may be wrong independently of considera-
tions of consent. 
 How do we determine what awareness is necessary for valid con-
sent? To answer this, we might start with the thought that the validity of 
consent depends on the voluntariness of the consent. In paradigmatic vol-
untary agency, an action is imputable to an agent because the action is 
caused and rationalized by the agent’s conative and cognitive states. Coer-
cion weakens the causal links between her conative states and the action—
the agent does not otherwise want to perform the action except to avoid 
the coercer’s threats. Consequently, to the extent that someone’s action is 
coerced, the action did not flow from her own voluntary agency. According 
to one view, for consent to be morally valid, it must meet a threshold for 
voluntariness; so, coercion could invalidate consent by making it insuﬃ-
ciently voluntary.  iii
 We might think that similarly, deception can invalidate consent by 
making it insuﬃciently voluntary (McGregor 2005: 181). Just as coercion 
weakens the connection between the agent’s conative states and her ac-
tion, false beliefs and ignorance could weaken the connections between her 
cognitive states and the action. If the agent is unaware of features of her 
action, then she does not intend these features. So if we were to describe 
what the agent does intentionally, we would not mention these features. In 
the case of consent, we might say that it is only to the extent that the 
agent is aware of an action’s features, she voluntarily consents to this ac-
tion. In this way, we might hold that to the extent that someone is misled 
about an action, the less willingly she engages with this act, and she is 
wronged to the extent that her will is not implicated in the act (Archard 
1998: 50).  
 Along these lines, we might classify features of an act, according to 
how undesirable the consent-giver finds these features. If a feature of an 
action only puts her oﬀ the action in a limited range of circumstances, that 
feature would be a reasonably weak deal-breaker. But if the feature put her 
oﬀ the action in nearly all circumstances, then it would be a fairly strong 
deal-breaker. Consequently, we could determine the voluntariness of a de-
cision to consent to an action, according to the strength of any deal-break-
ers that are being concealed (Manson 2017).  
 Alternatively, for the purposes of determining the validity of con-
sent, we could distinguish gradations of voluntariness in terms of the 
means by which the deception is achieved, e.g. whether it involves promis-
es, threats, harms or non-benefits (Feinberg 1986). This approach leaves 
us with the further question of how exactly a lack of awareness makes 
one’s consent involuntary? This seems as substantive as a prior question 
of how a lack of awareness could lead to an absence of valid consent. So it 
is unclear how much progress has been made with this approach. 
 Instead of appealing to voluntariness, we could focus on the content 
of someone’s consent. For example, we might claim that for some types of 
consent, someone validly consents to an encounter only if they intend to 
consent to that encounter. This claim follows straightforwardly if consent 
consists in a mental attitude (Hurd 1996; Alexander 1996, 2014. See the 
chapter in this handbook, WHAT IS CONSENT?). But it could also follow if 
we think that such an intention is necessary (although not suﬃcient) for 
some types of consent to be valid. Sexual consent might be a plausible ex-
ample. If an intention to consent to an encounter is necessary for validly 
consenting to the encounter, then we should consider the content of such 
an intention. This will determine whether the actual encounter that took 
place is one such that the consent-giver intended to consent to that en-
counter (rather than an entirely diﬀerent, merely hypothetical, encounter) 
(Dougherty 2013; Manson ms). 
Let us start with the fact that an intention is a propositional atti-
tude. Suppose Jane intends that John cuts her hair. The content of Jane’s 
intention is the proposition that John cuts Jane’s hair. In attributing this 
intention to Jane, we need not suppose that this is the only relevant inten-
tion of Jane’s. For example, we should also attribute to Jane an intention 
whose content is the proposition that the man in front of her cuts her hair. 
In this way, our attributions of intentions are similar to our attributions of 
other mental states, such as belief. When the haircut begins, Jane will not 
only believe that John is cutting her hair; she will also believe that the man 
in front of her is doing so. 
 At this juncture, we must say more about the nature of these 
propositions that constitute the content of these mental states. Consider a 
case of impersonation. Suppose Brian impersonates Robert Redford. As 
Brian is standing before Alice, she intends to have sex with him, thinking 
he is Robert Redford. It becomes tricky to characterize Alice’s attitudes 
because there is a man in front of her, and she takes herself to be consent-
ing to that man; but this man is Brian and Alice does not take herself to be 
consenting to sex with Brian. We could say that the contents of Alice’s in-
tentions are “mental descriptions,” (Hurd 1996). For example, Alice is 
consenting to sex with someone under the mental description of “Robert 
Redford.” Since this description picks out a man distinct from Brian, we 
can point to a key intention of Alice’s that does not include Brian in its 
content. Consequently, we can point to this mismatch between the event 
in the world, and the content of Alice's intentions, in order to explain why 
she did not validly consent to the event (Hurd 1996). 
 Although we theorists would be forced to use language to charac-
terize these mental descriptions, we should not assume that the mental 
descriptions themselves are linguistic entities. In other words, we need not 
think that mental descriptions are either natural language sentences that 
are consciously brought before the consent-giver’s mind, or sentences in a 
language of thought. Indeed, there is no reason to think that a natural lan-
guage like English is suﬃciently expressively rich that we can always ade-
quately articulate the relevant mental description using this language 
(McDowell 1984).  
 The idea that Brian does not fall within the content of Alice’s inten-
tion has sometimes been put in terms of a distinction in the philosophy of 
language between de dicto and de re attributions of attitudes. Heidi Hurd 
takes this approach in a passage that has been so influential that it is 
worth quoting in full: 
Suppose that Alice slept with a man she thought was Robert Red-
ford. He was not. Did she consent to sleep with him? The answer 
turns on whether her intention was de re or de dicto. If she intended to 
sleep with “that man”—whatever his name, profession or personal 
characteristics—then her intention was de re. Insofar as she slept 
with “that man,” she did what she intended to do, and hence, she 
consented to his actions. 
 If, on the other hand, she intended to sleep with “the Sundance 
Kid of movie fame,” then her intention was de dicto. Insofar as the 
man with whom she slept was not the famous Robert Redford, she 
did not intend, and hence, did not consent, to engage in sexual inter-
course with him. 
 Most intentions are de dicto, not de re. That is, most intentions 
are held under discrete descriptions. (Hurd 1996: 127; See also Lib-
erto forthcoming) 
Hurd is right to focus our attention on the exact content of Alice’s con-
sent. Using square brackets to indicate the “mental description” under 
which Alice conceptualises her intention, there is an important diﬀerence 
between these two intentions: 
(1) Alice intends that [she has sex with that man, whoever he is] 
(2) Alice intends that [she has sex with the Sundance Kid of movie 
fame] 
However, we should not follow Hurd in characterizing (1) as a de re inten-
tion, and (2) as a de dicto intention. Instead, if we use the de re / de dicto 
terminology in the standard way that it is used in the philosophy of mind 
and language, then both (1) and (2) are de dicto intention ascriptions. This 
is because both characterize the “mental description” of Alice’s intention 
in terms of concepts that Alice herself must possess (Burge 1977). By con-
trast, de re ascriptions of attitudes merely indicate relations of acquain-
tance. Consequently, these ascriptions can be made when someone is ac-
quainted with the subject matter of her attitude (Lewis 1979). We can 
make such an ascription in the case of Alice, since she is acquainted with 
someone—Brian: 
(3) Of Brian, Alice intends that she has sex with him 
Unlike (1) and (2), there are no square brackets in (3), since the de re in-
tention ascription does not characterize the “mental description” under 
which Alice intends sex. Consequently, de re ascriptions need not employ 
terms that express concepts employed by the subject herself. For example, 
(3) does not imply that Alice is thinking of Brian under the mental de-
scription “Brian.” Indeed, (3) can be true even if Brian has falsely said his 
name is “Robert.” The point that is crucial for our purposes is that simply 
because Alice is directly acquainted with Brian as her sexual partner, (3) 
will be true. Consequently, (3) will be true regardless of whether (1) is 
true or (2) is true. But if (2) and (3) are both true, then Alice does not 
validly consent to sex. As a result, (3) is insuﬃcient for Alice to validly 
consent to sex with Robert. In other words, a de re intention is insuﬃcient 
for valid consent. This point generalizes widely: because (conscious) sex 
involves acquaintance, de re sexual intentions are ubiquitous, and so will 
always be present when deception leads to non-consensual sex.  
 Again, it is important to bear in mind that a consent-giver will typi-
cally have multiple intentions. For example, Alice will no doubt also have 
this intention: 
(4) Alice intends that [she has sex with the man standing in front of 
her] 
Indeed, we need to attribute to Alice a de dicto intention that employs an 
indexical concept like “in front of her,” in order to explain e.g. her physical 
interactions with this man (Lewis 1979). Moreover, it is a de dicto attitude 
ascription like (4) that grounds the de re attitude ascription of (3). In other 
words, it is true that of Brian, Alice intends to have sex with him because 
Alice intends that [she has sex with the man standing in front of her]. As 
we have already noted, this attribution of the intention in (4) does not ex-
clude attributions of more specific intentions like (1) and (2). Clearly, Al-
ice will have intention (4) if she has intention (1). But she will also have 
intention (4), if she has intention (2). (Compare the analogues of predic-
tive belief attributions to (1), (2) and (4): clearly, Alice has the unspecific 
belief that she will have sex with the man standing in front of her.) So if 
we assume that Alice does not give valid consent if Brian has impersonated 
Robert Redford and (2) is true, then we should conclude that (4) is insuﬃ-
cient for Alice’s giving valid consent. To put that point in the language of 
“mental descriptions,” it is not enough for Alice to validly consent to sex 
with Brian that Alice consents under some description to sex with Brian. 
 Assuming Alice does not validly consent to Brian, how should we 
explain this? It is natural to look for mental descriptions, such that if 
someone gives sexual consent under one of these descriptions, and the de-
scription is not true of her sexual partner, then she does not validly con-
sent to the sex. This is a diﬃcult and substantive issue. One promising ap-
proach is to consider the question of which rights we have in the first 
place. One answer is that we only have coarse-grained rights not to have 
sex with someone (which we can waive for any reason at all), but lack fine-
grained rights not to have sex with someone-with-a-headache (Liberto 
forthcoming). On this view, if Jones intends to consent to sex with Smith 
under the description “Smith,” then this intention could constitute valid 
consent, even if Smith has a headache and Jones does not intend to con-
sent to sex with Smith under the description “Smith with a headache.” 
Alternatively, we could adopt a radical view that focuses on the fea-
tures of the sexual encounter that are material to someone’s decision to 
consent to sex. Let us define a “deal-breaker” as any feature of an en-
counter, such that the consent-giver is opposed to consenting to the en-
counter, given that it has this feature.  Now a consent-giver does not iniv -
tend to consent to any encounter that has a deal-breaker. So if such an in-
tention is necessary for valid consent to this encounter, then the following 
result holds: if an encounter only occurs because the consent-giver was 
deceived about a deal-breaker, then she does not validly consent to that 
encounter (Dougherty 2013). This result will strike many people as coun-
terintuitive, since it entails that even deception about someone’s income 
could lead to non-consensual sex, if a certain income was a deal-breaker 
for the consent-giver. The result may be more palatable if we allow that 
some forms of non-consensual sex are only minor wrongs, e.g. when the 
sex imposes only minor harms on the consent-giver (Boonin ms). 
In our discussion, we have been looking at the content of a con-
sent-giver’s intentions. But in closing, we should note that there is another 
option: we could look at the content of their expressions of consent, and 
consider when and how deception might result in this content failing to 
include the interaction that actually takes place. This option will seem par-
ticularly appealing if we think that communication is necessary for valid 
consent (Dougherty 2015). But it is an option that has received little at-
tention to date, and so for now must remain an avenue for future research. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed diﬀerent accounts of the relation between de-
ception and consent, organized around a novel distinction between duty-
first and awareness-first approaches. While analytically distinct, these ap-
proaches need not be competitors, as there may be more than one way that 
deception relates to consent. The approaches have diﬀerent advantages and 
disadvantages. Duty-first approaches start with an independent account of 
key duties not to deceive, and then use this account to say that when these 
duties are not met, the deceiver lacks her victim’s valid consent to the ac-
tion in question. These approaches have the advantage of making the aeti-
ology of false beliefs intrinsically morally relevant—they claim that there is 
no valid consent only when the false beliefs are caused by the consent-re-
ceiver failing in her duties. But a disadvantage of duty-first approaches is 
that they now owe us an account of what these key duties are. This disad-
vantage is not faced by awareness-first approaches. These approaches be-
gin by specifying an independent account of the awareness necessary for 
valid consent. This opens up the possibility of appealing to this account in 
outlining the rationale for our duties not to deceive. But the approaches 
come with the cost of failing to make the aetiology of false beliefs intrinsi-
cally relevant to whether consent is valid. 
 Duty-first and awareness-first approaches both need to choose 
which features of an encounter are such that deception about these fea-
tures will lead to an absence of valid consent to this encounter. They are 
choosing between similar options. For example, they could focus narrowly 
on some special features, or broadly include any features that the consent-
giver considered materially relevant to her consent. But while both duty-
first and awareness-first approaches share these options in common, their 
motivations for choosing between these options may diﬀer. On duty-first 
approaches, we would fundamentally be concerned with identifying the 
duties that one must fulfil in order to create an e.g. adequately fair context 
for a consent transaction. This would frame our choice as one to be guided 
by concerns of fairness. On an awareness-first approach, we would funda-
mentally be concerned with identifying true beliefs that one must have ei-
ther for consent to be voluntary, or for the consent’s content to include the 
actual encounter. In this way, the distinction between duty-first and 
awareness-first approaches is not only useful for characterizing the internal 
justificatory structure of a view of consent. It also helps make clear how 
diﬀerent approaches should go about determining which types of decep-
tion lead to non-consensual behavior.  
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 One option, which may turn out to be an alternative to both approaches, is the i
idea that deception leads to an absence of valid consent for an encounter when the 
deception has a suﬃciently adverse eﬀect on the meaning and value of the en-
counter (Tadros 2016).
 For criticism of this option, see (Manson 2017; Jubb forthcoming; Lazenby & ii
Gabriel forthcoming; Liberto forthcoming).
 For (to my mind, decisive) criticism of this view of why coercion debilitates iii
consent, see (Liberto ms). See also (Tadros 2016).
 As a flawed rule of thumb, we might employ counterfactuals: for most deal-iv
breakers it will be the case that, were the consent-giver aware of the feature, then 
she would not have decided to consent. But this counterfactual test is only good as 
a rough and ready heuristic and faces counterexamples—see (Chadha 2016; 
Tadros 2016). To canonically state what a deal-breaker is, we should not consider 
counterfactual mental states, but instead focus on the actual content of the con-
sent-giver’s actual mental states (Dougherty 2013).
